## PBF Project Document

**Country (ies):** Libya

**Project Title:** Towards national reconciliation in Libya  
**Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):** PBF/IRF-147

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<th>PBF project modality:</th>
<th>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund:</th>
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**Name of Recipient Fund:**

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organization (UN, CSO etc): UNDP, UNSMIL Political Affairs Division.

List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:

- Government of National Accord of Libya (Ministry of National Reconciliation and Ministry of Planning) NGOs, (i.e. Interpeace, Peaceful Change Initiative, USIP, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Benghazi University Center for Research and Consultation, Libyan civil society organizations, Women and youth organizations)

**Expected project commencement date:** January 2017  
**Project duration in months:** 18 months  
**Geographic zones for project implementation:**

**Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below:**

- Gender promotion initiative
- Youth promotion initiative
- Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions
- Cross-border or regional project

**Total PBF approved project budget** (by recipient organization):  
- PBF fully allocated 1st tranche: $ 2,081,171.4  
- PBF conditional 2nd tranche: $ 891,930.6

**Total:** $ 2,973,102

*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSD's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account*

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):

**Project total budget:** $ 2,973,102

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1. Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.  
2. Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.
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Two-three sentences with a brief project description and succinct explanation of how the project is time sensitive, catalytic and risk-tolerant/innovative:

This project is assisting Libyan national and local authorities, civil society and other partners in their effort to promote an inclusive vision for national reconciliation. Stakeholders are empowered to implement a comprehensive national reconciliation strategy that will adequately contribute to the democratic process in Libya and recognize the specific roles of women and youth. Support is provided to local reconciliation initiatives in order to include them into the nation-wide dynamics of peace.

Summarize the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists:

Project Gender Marker score: 2
Specify % and $ of total project budget allocated to activities in direct pursuit of gender equality and women’s empowerment:

Project Risk Marker score: 1

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (select ONLY one): 2.1
Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):
(2.1) National reconciliation

If applicable, UNDAF outcome(s) to which the project contributes:

If applicable, Sustainable Development Goal to which the project contributes:

Type of submission:

- [ ] New project
- [x] Project amendment

If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:

- Extension of duration: [x] Additional duration in months: 6 months
- Change of project outcome/ scope: [ ]
- Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%: [x]

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3 Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective  
Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective  
Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 15% of budget)

4 Risk marker 0 = low risk to achieving outcomes  
Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes  
Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

5 PBF Focus Areas are:  
(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;  
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;  
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services  
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)
Additional PBF budget: □ Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX0.0

Brief justification for amendment:

During the last project board meeting that took place in Tunis on December 13, 2017, the members agreed that a no cost extension is necessary after a year of working in an unpredictable and challenging situation.

The project learned valuable lessons to increase its delivery including strengthening partnership with national counterpart to facilitate the work on the ground and increase local ownership. The project has contributed to bringing together key actors involved and interested in the national reconciliation process in Libya, effectively bringing reconciliation at the forefront of public debates in the country. The multiple dialogues that took place in the framework of the project have considerably reinforced the UN's understanding of national and local reconciliation dynamics in Libya, thus impacting the UN led political process. The project has also consolidated a network of trusted, active and capacitated actors of reconciliation that are being mobilized throughout the project implementation, while also supporting the peacebuilding process and dialogue. National reconciliation is now at the heart of the Action Plan of SRSNG Ghassan Salame, with more attention given to local reconciliation initiatives so they can be linked to the national level of peace agenda.

Through the project, UNDP and UNSMIL have reinforced their network and links with civil society organizations and grassroots Libyan actors (municipalities, tribal elders, youth, but also militia) that can provide advice, share information and regularly update on the developments to strengthen the peacebuilding process and insure its sustainability.

The following point are further discussed below in the document under Project Outcomes to elaborate the need for the no cost extension:

- The inability to hold thematic and technical committee meetings, training and dialogue events in Libya, due to political sensitivity, has complicated technical and logistical preparations to provide safe space for participants.
- Disbursement of small grants to CSOs has been hindered by lack of cash in Libya.
- Women participants has been low due to Libyan customary practices of conflict resolution, but also to the security situation.
- Procurement of the media campaign has been delayed.

UNDP would like to take this opportunity to underline the need for extending the project’s activities. Currently the project end date is 30 June 2018. UNDP requests that the project end date to be extended to 31 December 2018. The project is planning to use the remaining funds as explained in updated Project Document and Budget below (in track changes).
Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.
## PROJECT SIGNATURES:

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<th>Recipient Organization(s)*</th>
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<td><strong>Name of Government Counterpart</strong></td>
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<td>Sultan Hajiyev</td>
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<td><strong>Country Director</strong></td>
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<td>Maria do Vale Ribeiro</td>
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* Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.
Dear Mr. Fernandez-Taranco,

Subject: No-Cost Extension of “Towards national reconciliation in Libya” Project # 00099570

I would like to refer to the above project implemented by UNDP with joint inputs from UNSMIL. UNDP has prepared a request for a no-cost extension until 31 December 2018, which I endorsed and is attached herewith.

During the last project board meeting that took place in Tunis on December 13, 2017, the members agreed that a no cost extension is necessary after a year of working in an unpredictable and challenging situation. Despite challenges such as the inability to hold meetings and workshops in Libya, the slow disbursement of grants to CSOs due to the lack of cash in the country, as well as other procurement issues, the project has learned valuable lessons to increase its delivery, including strengthening partnership with national counterpart to facilitate the reconciliation work on the ground and to increase local ownership. The multiple dialogues that took place in the framework of the project have considerably reinforced the UN’s understanding of national and local reconciliation dynamics in Libya, thus impacting the UN-led political process in return.

However, in the absence of a stable national counterpart (be it a dedicated Ministry or Commission), and as the political situation is still unstable in the preparation of the upcoming elections, we are unable to obtain a direct endorsement of the extension of the project by the Libyan government.

As a result, it is suggested, as was the case of the project approval in January 2017, that waiving the necessity for government’s sign-off due to the current political situation is the most reasonable course of action.

Therefore, I kindly request that this letter is considered in lieu of a direct endorsement by the national counterpart to the project.

with warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator,
UNDP Resident Representative for Libya

Mr. Fernandez-Taranco,
Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
New York
"Towards National Reconciliation in Libya"

PROJECT COMPONENTS

Background

1. Despite some progress, Libyans have so far been unable to translate early revolutionary successes into a meaningful, stable and inclusive transition process. Post-revolutionary divisions and political polarization escalated into open armed confrontation in July 2014, leading to two rival governance: the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR) and interim Government in Tobruk and Baida, and the General National Congress (GNC) and the so called “Government of National Salvation” in Tripoli. The United Nations launched a political dialogue process in 2014, which led to the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015. A nine-member Presidency Council (PC) was tasked with nominating the Government of National Accord (GNA), restarting the country’s transition process. The LPA provides a supportive political framework for national reconciliation, including by creating a fact-finding commission, a commission on missing persons, various accountability mechanisms, local governance measures, DDR programmes and other institutional reforms. However, these measures have yet to be implemented.

2. Since its establishment in Tripoli in March 2016, the GNA has attempted to gradually consolidate its authority and, despite many challenges, it has been able to operate from key government buildings in the capital. The HoR however remained unable to meet and amend the constitutional amendment, in order to constitutionalize the institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement. Opposition to the LPA continued and Article 8 of the Agreement's Additional provisions remained a key controversial issue, concerning the appointment of military leadership positions and the structure of the armed forces.

3. The challenges in the endorsement of the GNA and the implementation of the LPA reflect deeper regional, social and political divisions, legacies of the Qaddafi era and the civil war ranging from the east/west and the Islamist/non-Islamist divides to rivalries between towns, tribes, or marginalized communities. National reconciliation is thus an intrinsic dimension of the peacebuilding process: peacebuilding strategies geared to create a national reconciliation process can indeed strengthen the ongoing political dialogue, and ultimately underpin the LPA framework and institutions.

4. Reconciliation has a variety of meanings. It potentially includes mediation, peace agreements, conflict resolution, healing, forgiveness, restoring trust, coexistence, and nation building. There are three levels of reconciliation: interpersonal (between victims and perpetrators); community (both between and within communities); and national (through new values, national identity, nation-building). Reconciliation can be generally understood as managing individual and collective identities to remove “the negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity”18. Conflict creates indeed a certain ethos, a set of societal and psychological beliefs that are strong obstacles to reconciliation, such as the belief in the justness of one’s own and only goals, or the systematic delegitimizing of one’s opponent. Transforming these attitudes requires reflecting upon what ties a group together, and discussing what are the conditions for living together in the future. While transitional justice (truth, justice, reparations and institutional reforms) is an essential part of reconciliation in the long term, it should not be seen as absolute preconditions for it, as such an approach disempowers those on the ground, who are actually affected by the conflict. This balance sheet or “checklist” approach should be avoided in favour of creating, instead, an enabling framework for reconciliation to take place in the Libyan context. This would imply finding a consensus about what

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1 See the comprehensive report of the experts meeting on national reconciliation organized by UNSMIL and UNDP in August/September 2016. Available upon request to UNSMIL/PAD.

reconciliation means in the Libyan context.

5. The national reconciliation “track” has been side-lined since 2011, although the United Nations Support Mission in Libya was established in 2011 primarily to assist Libyan authorities in “restoring public security and the rule of law, promoting inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation”. The focus on early elections and on providing a legislative framework for transitional justice, with the hope that this would eventually lead to reconciliation, has proved only partially successful, as the UN Secretary General, in his May 2016 report to the Security Council, underscored: “Only by upholding the higher national interests of Libya through a spirit of inclusivity and reconciliation can there be any viable hope for successful implementation of the Agreement and for a transition period in which immediate challenges can be addressed effectively and the process of building a modern, democratic state anchored in the rule of law and respect for human rights can be started” (S/2016/452). Peacebuilding in Libya should have a reconciliation dimension.

I. Peacebuilding context and rationale for IRF

a) Peacebuilding context

6. Beyond a loose idea of overthrowing the regime, the various local communities and groups opposed to the former regime in 2011 had little in common, and seemed to be lacking a common vision for a post-Gadhafi future. As a consequence, loyalty to the country became subordinate to local geographic and communal identities. This fragmentation was later reinforced by the presence of deeply competing political visions for Libya, including with regards to how the State should be organised and its relationship with its citizens, the role of religion, the protection of minorities and women’s rights, or the best ways to deal with the country’s tumultuous past. Despite a number of unsuccessful attempts by formal and informal actors to start a broader national dialogue process, including through the creation of the National Dialogue Preparatory Committee in 2013/2014, there has been little opportunity for Libyans to engage in a public dialogue and the deteriorating security situation has further impeded the process to take place.

7. In that context, it has proved impossible for national actors to foster a truly inclusive, legitimate and representative narrative about the past or to form a coherent vision for the future, to overcome mistrust between groups and communities and the divisions among regions, political orientations, or between the “old” and the new order. To avoid repeating past mistakes, one should be honest and realistic about what reconciliation in Libya can achieve. The process should be about rights to be enshrined in legislation and policy as well as about confidence-building measures between different communities and between local communities and the government. In some ways, deep and comprehensive reconciliation is as important as a constitution: in Libya, it would aim at laying the basis for a new social contract and establishing legitimacy for institutions. If reconciliation is unlikely to overcome mistrust, it can at least start managing it, including by accommodating competing and opposing narratives of the past and the conflict.

A. Main drivers of conflict

i. The presence of unaccountable armed groups

9 The UNSMIL-backed National Dialogue Initiative was undermined by rival initiatives led by some politicians of the GNC who led their own “dialogues”. It also lacked allocated funds from the General National Congress until fighting broke out in several parts of Libya in the summer of 2014, making reconciliation impossible to implement. At its core was a National Preparatory Dialogue Commission of 15 volunteers, whose goal was to conduct a wide-ranging consultation and to draft a common charter on what kind of Libya the Libyans wanted, leading in a six months period to a National Dialogue Conference of between 200 and 250 members. The mechanism for appointing these members would have been discussed through the consultations.
8. The proliferation of unaccountable and community-specific armed groups ("kata'ib" or militias) in Libya, and the absence of an effective formal security sector entrusted with the monopoly of the use of force, has further undermined the country's instability. Forming a common vision on the unification of security actors into a single formal structure remains a key challenge. Extremist groups have thrived in this political and security vacuum, consolidating their influence in Derna, Sirte and Benghazi in 2015, benefiting from a large disempowered youth population more prone to radicalization discourses.

9. In a general climate of impunity, some militias managed to progressively gain more control over a wide variety of issues (including tribal, religious, economical, or social). With a view to establishing an inclusive security structure, strong incentives should be identified to persuade security actors to work for peace in the interest of their country. The feeble trust in the new government also means that most militias are still unwilling to concede the potential influence they had gained through their possession of weapons or their new symbolic status as «revolutionary fighters».

10. Armed groups have built part of their strength and legitimacy on the grievances of the Libyan population. There is a perception that some communities have suffered more human rights abuses or war crimes in the past than others, endured more sacrifices, and that these violations have not yet been properly addressed or acknowledged. This feeling is most widespread in pro-revolution communities that were at the forefront of the early protests and paid a high price of the revolution and ensuing conflict. Similar narratives have also become common among perceived "anti-revolution" communities that suffered from the later stages of the war and feel that their own "martyrs" have not yet been properly recognized. The absence of a comprehensive transitional justice process has fed into these grievances. Continued impunity, punitive actions, extra-judicial arrests or killings, as well as the ill treatment of detainees and the lack of due process, have encouraged vicious cycles of revenge, further impeding the prospects for national reconciliation. The passing of controversial and exclusionary laws such as the Political Isolation Law and an amnesty law for anti-Gaddafi fighters\(^\text{10}\) have raised accusations of selective or "victors' justice", feeding into more divisions, distrust, and grievances. More generally, the degree to which the wrongs of the past should be addressed is a key divider between political actors in the country. To avoid conflicts of interest when dealing with past violations, international involvement is necessary.

\(\text{ii. Social fragmentation and local conflicts}\)

11. Movements behind the revolution of 2011 had a very local dynamic, with revolutionary militias and local councils emerging from these communities to address their specific needs. In the institutional vacuum that followed, and was a consequence of the conflict, many areas in Libya gained de facto local autonomy, and the local councils created during the revolution saw their legitimacy increase following local elections. But these de facto autonomous geographic communities may undermine state-building efforts, as they may seek to assert their authority independently from the central government. Tribal structures in particular have, in some places, gained real managerial and administrative tasks at municipal level.

12. This process reinforced subnational identities around geographic communities, tribal or ethnic groups, and led to multiple disputes between these groups in different parts of the country. While often localized in nature, these sporadic acts of violence can lead to broader instability in the country as local communities, with the support of armed groups, could be encouraged to use force to preserve their authority\(^\text{11}\). These local conflicts are generally driven by competition over access to economic resources, political participation, access to basic services or the unresolved issues of demographic

\(^{10}\) Law n° 38/2011 grants blanket amnesty and immunity from prosecution to those who protected or promoted the revolution. Although it excludes crimes as torture or rape, in practice all rebel crimes have been de facto amnestied.

\(^{11}\) Local conflicts are prominent in the south of the country. In the southeast, significant tensions exist in Kufra between the dominant Arab Zwaya tribe and the Tabu community. In the southwest, tensions exist between various communities, particularly between various Arab tribes and the Tabu in Sabha, and between the Tabu and the Tuareg communities around the town of Awbari, or between Qaddafi and Awlad Sulaiman tribes. In the west, examples include violence between Misrata and Tawergha, between Misrata and Bani Walid, as well as between Zintan and other towns in the Nafusa mountains.
change, land ownership and citizenship rights.

13. These local level conflicts are often dealt with locally, through negotiation led by community or traditional leaders organized in “Shura councils”, as observed in the Misrata/Tawergha agreement, between Tebu and Tuareg in the South, or in the Nafusa Mountains. These initiatives so far have remained mostly ad hoc and limited to these constituencies. They often consist of a “light” version of reconciliation, ceasefire agreement with some confidence-building measures: a rather “thin” understanding of reconciliation involving an exchange of prisoners, the payment of compensations, the reopening of some roads and the establishment of regular channels of communications to avoid isolated incidents escalating into new rounds of violence. This approach, while contributing to temporarily cease hostilities locally, does not bring sustainable peace and fails to address the structural causes of violence, thereby leaving a return to violence in the near future possible. Focusing only on the micro-level also bears the risk of further fragmenting the social fabric.

14. While local ceasefires and reconciliation agreements are indicative of Libya’s own capacities for building peace, their limited focus and the absence of a central state to ensure implementation have prevented them from having a strong, national impact so far, in particular when it comes to compensations. They have also, sometimes, reinforced tribal and ethnic senses of belonging. More synergies and linkages between national and local reconciliation initiatives should therefore be promoted.

iii. Low levels of trust and high expectations

15. High expectations on the pace of developing a new governance system can be considered a potential driver of conflict in Libya, as these expectations are often unrealistic and demonstrate a lack of understanding of what is required to build a truly democratic state. This social pressure could also push the authorities into rushed decisions to ease these demands, as demonstrated, for instance, with the passing of the Political Isolation Law in 2013. The low levels of trust of many local communities towards the central authorities reinforce this risk.

16. The inability to engage in real, inclusive consultations since the 2011 uprising, as well as the lack of progress on political and economic fronts, further contributed to this absence of trust and low social capital. There has been limited effort to communicate the work of the LPD, the content of the LPA and the new institutions that sprung from it, in particular the PC/GNA. No outreach programme has yet been put in place to engage Libyans, especially the youth, in the process.

iv. The lack of a national identity

17. There is no clear consensus among Libyans on their national identity, which is a point of contention in itself, especially in the absence (partly due to a deliberate policy of the former regime) of any consensual, unifying figures (whether historical, artistic, political, or else), upon which all Libyans could identify. Several other factors have contributed to this difficulty.

18. The rapid development of the country’s oilfields brought many migrant workers, especially from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Tabu and Tuareg communities of neighbouring Chad and Niger, raising fears that this would affect the country’s demographic balance and threaten its Arab-Berber domination. This rapid influx resulted in deeper disputes over who had the right to call themselves ‘Libyan’ and who should be considered as ‘foreigners’, raising suspicions about Tuareg and Tabu right to Libyan nationality. These disputes over nationality and land ownership are closely linked to a deeper prejudice

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12 See the comprehensive mapping of local reconciliation and ceasefire initiatives conducted by UNSMIL in October 2016.
13 Ibid. The authors show that most local reconciliation initiative take place without any external, financial or logistical support, with the exception of the Misrata-Tawergha (UNSMIL) and the Tabu-Tuareg (Qatar and San’ Edigio) processes. This lack of support has often impeded not only the launching of the initiatives, but also their monitoring and successful implementation.
against black Africans more generally, including former mercenaries or black Libyan communities, such as the Tawergha. It led to increased inter-ethnic tensions and violent clashes that were exacerbated by the revolution and conflict, and have continued to negatively affect the transition process as minorities, in particular, fear of not having their rights adequately protected within the new Constitution.

19. While the drafting of the Constitution could, as in neighbouring Tunisia, become a strong nation-building moment, the process in Libya has remained an elite level and controversial activity. The Constitutional Drafting Assembly has engaged in only limited outreach, and the broader Libyan public has not participated in the process so far.

20. Other factors also prevent the building of a common vision of the Libyan state, including deeply divided political narratives. Opposition between newly empowered rebels who fought against the former regime (*Thawar*, or revolutionaries), and the remaining political and military elite who built their careers under Qaddafi (*Aslam*, or former regime), dominated the post-2011 political landscape in Libya. This divide demonstrates the complexity of addressing the past and reforming the country’s institutions towards national reconciliation. The first current has advocated for a strong break from the past and the legacy of the former regime, and has sought to protect the ‘principles of the revolution’. These groups benefited the most after 2011 from their roles during the revolution, and therefore have a strong interest in defending those gains: they include revolutionary groups from the west, but also Islamist actors such as the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. The second current, while not necessarily counter-revolutionary or pro-Qaddafi *per se*, promotes a reformist vision for Libya, which does not straightforwardly exclude those who supported the former regime and recommends, instead, building upon the existing capacities of the Libyan state. It includes some armed groups from the east, as well technocrats and officials of the former regime who defected before or during the revolution.

21. Addressing this divide would imply the implementation of a truly fair and transparent vetting process, far from the exclusionary spirit of the Political Isolation Law of 2013 or the ambiguities of the transitional justice law of 2013 \(^{14}\). The Libyan Political Dialogue (LPD) process, facilitated by UNSMIL, has attempted to bring both sides together around the formation of a Government of National Accord (GNA). It had a significant role in reducing violence in the country, and further efforts are still being exerted to bring all key stakeholders on board and overcome this political schism.

v. The international community and the limits of the peace process

22. The international community seems to have underestimated the deep divisions and fault lines present in Libya, owing to its recent history. These divisions are partly the result of historical competition for the control of the State institutions between elites from the west and the east since Libya’s independence. The divisions were also a direct consequence of Qaddafi’s “divide-and-rule” policy during his 42-year reign, playing upon and reinforcing the rivalries between regions, tribes, cities and communities. Furthermore, the decision by Libyan politicians and the international community to privilege early electoral competition without engaging in a prior national dialogue and reconciliation process led to a political deadlock, which further reinforced these divisions.

23. Reconciliation needs to go beyond the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement: while it remains mindful of its framework and the institutions it creates, and should contribute to its success, the reconciliation process should not be tied to the LPA. It should engage with people who oppose it, and be able to continue should the agreement fail. The Libyan Political Dialogue, while encompassing representatives from the different regions of Libya to monitor the implementation of the LPA, is a

\(^{14}\) The law seeks to achieve “the legal recognition of the just character of the February 17 Revolution” and to “criminalize the former era”, an imprecise categorization of affiliation with the former regime that can be used to arbitrarily exclude or further punish military or political opponents from the past. See the comprehensive mapping of the legal framework of national reconciliation conducted by UNSMIL in October 2016, which demonstrates the politicization of some of the national reconciliation related laws since the revolution and analyses its pitfalls.
limited, formal and *ad hoc* dialogue that only addresses political issues. It does not include local and influential actors such as tribes or the armed factions, nor does it touch on wider social and community-based concerns. This focus has significantly impacted the implementation of the LPA until now. Current polarizing issues go well beyond these institutional debates and formal processes that remain abstract to many Libyans: they include the provision of basic goods and services, concerns about security, the role of former regime officials, different views on Islam, politics, and identity more generally, but also on the best way to respond to the crimes of the past, the constitutional framework of the future state, the recognition of minorities' rights or the choice between a centralized or a federal model. Reconciliation would thus contribute to reinforcing and concretizing a multi-track approach to peacebuilding in Libya.

B. Peace capacities

1. Informal actors at the local level

24. Effective peace initiatives do exist in Libya, especially at the local level, and they should be built upon. These local reconciliation processes thrived after 2015\(^\text{15}\), and mostly rely on local and traditional leaders and elders for mediation, implementation and monitoring. They build upon a certain sense of local belonging and often use traditional mediation tools through informal networks of "elders", tribal or municipal councils, which currently enjoy more public trust than central authorities and could therefore become powerful vectors of reconciliation, if they manage to be sufficiently detached from political interference.

25. Historically, tribes have long played a crucial role in promoting national reconciliation\(^\text{16}\): tribal leaders can indeed use their influence to compel their members to refrain from revenge killing and encourage ceasefire agreements, building upon traditional forms of mediation. Strong social networks within tribes, families and communities are important moderators on individual actions more generally. *Shura* councils, or "majlis shura" are thus positive structures that could become forums for dialogue and reconciliation, as demonstrated through various nationwide initiatives recently (for instance, with various degrees of success, in the Nalut or Jihkhurat national reconciliation meetings during the Fall 2016). Traditional conflict resolution is indeed more accessible, rapid, context-responsive and less costly, permitting a more participatory approach to reconciliation that has been insufficiently supported so far. Local peace efforts are thus important, Libyan-owned mechanisms for building stability within the country, ahead of efforts to address the structural causes of conflict at local and national levels. Ultimately, it is on this breeding ground of absence of heavy violence and existing channels of communication at the local level that the vicious circle between violence and lack of reconciliation at the national level can be broken.

ii. Civil society

26. During the Qaddafi era, independent civil society organizations (CSOs) and media were severely curtailed, allowing only those close to the regime to function. In the wake of the 2011 revolution, often with the support of international organizations, CSOs played a significant role and started to proliferate throughout the country\(^\text{17}\). This widespread civic engagement ranged from religion to sports, arts, music, human rights, humanitarian or charitable groups, and contributed to developing a new Libyan identity through common interests that cut across their origins while encouraging public participation, tolerance

\(^{15}\) For instance, Zintan struck separate agreements with Gharyan, Janzour, Zawiya and Rajba in June, July and August 2015 as well as Zuwara. Zuwara has come to terms with its neighbouring communities of Al-Jmail, Rigdahin and Zultan. Misrata and Tarhuna signed a reconciliation agreement in August 2016, facilitated by UNSMIL.

\(^{16}\) As experienced in 1946 with the "Harabi Charter" in which, in the fight against the colonizer, tribes agreed to postpone the resolution of their grievances and conflict until after the creation of the Libyan state

\(^{17}\) A 2013 roster of civil society organizations conducted by UNDP and UNICEF estimated that around 2000 registered CSOs were active in Libya, a high concentration compared to the number of inhabitants.
and pluralism\textsuperscript{18}. However, the deteriorating security situation after 2014 forced many CSOs to cease their activities. Activists have fled the country for fear of attacks\textsuperscript{19}. But no matter the area of activity, CSOs members tend to share a stronger sense of national identity and solidarity as well as a greater level of trust, thereby making them potentially strong agents of change. Youth civic engagement in particular should be encouraged: while they account for more than 40 per cent of the population and were at the heart of the revolution, youth remain absent from the political dialogue, the peace process, and even local reconciliation efforts, making them easier target for recruitment by extremist groups.

\textit{iii. Women}

27. The legacy of the Qaddafi era strongly impacted the Libyan women’s movement until today. Indeed, the former regime granted equal opportunities and participation in the public life for all Libyan women, safeguarding their freedoms and liberties through what could be called a “State feminism”\textsuperscript{20}. Despite this progressive framework, however, women have remained economically, politically and socially under-represented in public life, while laws pertaining to gender equality, especially in the realm of personal and family affairs, were unevenly applied and often sidestepped by misinterpretation of Islamic law, patriarchy and local customs. Having actively contributed to the fall of Qaddafi, having also been directly targeted during the conflict through rape, sexual violence, intimidation and persecutions, women claimed more rights to fully participate in the transition. They were, however, rapidly forced to align with existing ideological groups, and their movement was fragmented.

\textit{iv. Youth}

28. Youth activism was at the heart of the revolution, and youth’s expectations of change were very high in 2011. This large youth cohort is both an asset and a significant source of instability, as thousands of young fighters are awaiting demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. Finding strong incentives for them to engage on national reconciliation will be key to the success of the entire process, through adequate programmes of sensitization and outreach. The constructive engagement of youth in the reconciliation process is indeed critical for them not to become spoilers or threaten its legitimacy.

b) Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps

29. Most CSOs and national or international NGOs currently intervening in the area of national reconciliation are either focused on the local level or sectorial, i.e. focused on only one aspect of reconciliation (such as transitional justice, media reform, women and youth empowerment or land). A more comprehensive approach to analyse, build and learn from these positive efforts and link them to state-building is still lacking.

30. Too often, “reconciliation” appears to be understood in a rather “thin” or negative manner, only as a ceasefire, or is either confused with transitional justice or with the political dialogue. Finally, youth and women still remain at the margin of reconciliation efforts, both at the local and national levels. However, these initiatives are all strong assets and potential partners for the successful implementation of this PBF project.

\textbf{Table 1 – Mapping of peacebuilding activities and gaps}

\textsuperscript{18} See the Libya civil society roster of UNDP and UNICEF, 2013.
\textsuperscript{19} World Value Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, available at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
\textsuperscript{20} This included equal access to education, social benefits and the legal system; rights to participate in the General People’s Committees and national security; rights in marriage, divorce and custody; rights to equal pay and full control over their income and assets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project outcome</th>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>Key projects/activities</th>
<th>Duration of projects/activities</th>
<th>Budget in $</th>
<th>Description of major gaps in the outcome area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Change Initiative</td>
<td>Switzerland, UK, EU</td>
<td>1 - Build local capacity to roll out 'Social Peace and Local Development' (SPLD) methodology in Libya; 2 - Implement SPLD method in 14 target communities; 3 - Network peacebuilding practitioners across the country.</td>
<td>18 Months from November 2015</td>
<td>2,400,000 USD</td>
<td>1. Intention to build on foundations established after March 2017. Review underway to identify key areas for further development. 2. Focused on Aubari; AlBeyda; AlSahel; Bani Walid; Benghazi; Misrata; Murzuq; Nalut; Sabha; Suq Al Juma; Tiji; Wadi AlBawanes (a part of Sabha); and Waddan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL Women Empowerment Section / UNDP</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1. Support the Women's Empowerment and Support Unit at the Presidency Council; 2. Support women CSO to lobby for women's rights; 3. Support the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in all international support being provided to Libya during the transition.</td>
<td>2015/2017</td>
<td>500,000 USD</td>
<td>Focused on women and wider focus than reconciliation only, but complementary project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL Human Rights Division (HRD) / UNDP</td>
<td>Germany, Italy</td>
<td>1. Local and national level dialogue and dispute resolution processes developed and implemented to reduce conflict between communities; 2. Key stakeholders in Libya are better</td>
<td>2 years from March 2016</td>
<td>3,227,566 USD</td>
<td>Focused on transitional justice / local but complementary project, especially for output 2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| UNDP/ UNSMIL Department of Political Affairs (DPA) | EU Germany Switzerland Italy, Malta, Norway, Netherlands and UK | able to design and implement transitional justice plans to promote sub-national and national reconciliation;
3. Local communities are better able promote safety and security for returning populations. | Since 2015 | 13,500,000 (US$) | Mostly top-down assistance / institutional & political support |
| UNDP Promote citizen's participation in the Constitution making process | Japan, Sweden (SIDA), Denmark, UN Peace Building Fund & UNDP | 1. Provision of support to the national dialogue process in Libya;
2. Technical assistance to support the Government of National Accord (GNA);
3. Support dialogue meetings, provide technical advice to the GNA, including in communication & outreach. | 2012/2016 | 6,300,000 (US$) | Complementary project on the political dialogue and outreach part, but narrower focus. |
<p>| Humanitarian Dialogue Centre Supporting | EU | To improve conflict mediation effort at the institutional level and at the | 2015/2017 | 2,264,800 (US$) | Mostly focused in the East (Benghazi). |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Implementing Entity</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Geographical Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libyan mediation process</td>
<td>Interpeace, Switzerland</td>
<td>Identify innovative peacebuilding strategies (mapping) that can further contribute to the broader Libyan dialogue process for peace by learning from local processes.</td>
<td>2015/2016 70,000 USD</td>
<td>Geographically focused only on Ghat, Gadames, Nalut, Yefren, Beni Waled, Misratah, Al Marj.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers for justice in Libya</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1. Security evidence and documentation of human rights violations; 2. Provide the public greater insight and analysis into violations; 3. Increase the capacity of local actors to document violations.</td>
<td>2016/2017 100,000 USD</td>
<td>Narrow-focused project but key contribution in view of a future transitional justice process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC Media Action support - Hivar Mush'taraq</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1. Support an informed and engaged Libyan public by providing citizens with a safe space to freely discuss and debate key issues facing their country; 2. Provide a forum for constructive engagement of journalists; 3. Engage local audiences on subjects related to Libya's political transition.</td>
<td>2015/2016 700,000 USD</td>
<td>Media sector only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Agency of the Association of</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1. Improve management of selected</td>
<td>2016/2018 2,984,349 USD</td>
<td>Sectorial focus (municipalities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands Municipalities (VNG)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Municipal councils; 2. Improve service delivery by local government; 3. Promote participation and interaction of civil society in council's affairs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNESCO-Ministry of Youth and Sport - ACTED</strong></td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Supporting constructive youth engagement in Libya, through “Networks of Mediterranean Youth” platform to enhance the capacity of Libyan youth associations and NGOs to play a greater role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.</td>
<td>2014/2017</td>
<td>387,700 (US$) Youth focused but complementary project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VVI</strong></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Solving the real property conflicts in post-Gaddafi Libya, in the context of transitional justice</td>
<td>2015/2017</td>
<td>226,337 (EUR) Land focused but complementary project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom House and American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative</strong></td>
<td>USA USAID</td>
<td>1. Promote a systematic solution to land and housing conflicts caused by Gaddafi legislation, embedded in Libya’s transitional justice mechanisms.</td>
<td>2014/2017</td>
<td>4,060,000 (US$) Geographically focused on Tobruk, Ajdabiya, Shahhat, Sebha, Misratah, Beni Walid, Az Zawiyah, Gharyan, Jadu, Zintan, Brak/Wadi Al Shatii, Awbari, al Kufra, al Baydah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting &amp; Governing Process in Libya</td>
<td>referendum vote.</td>
<td>Legal/constitution focused</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute for War and Peace Reporting (international)</td>
<td>USA MEPI</td>
<td>1. Provide in-house training and support media partners on TV and radio production; 2. Work with FM radio partners to produce transition related discussion programs; 3. Support the development of new generation media professionals through university journalism training; 4. Contribute to Libya’s media sector by increasing the safety/security of media professionals working in-country.</td>
<td>2013/2017 3,200,000 (US$)</td>
<td>Media focused but complementary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c) Rationale for this IRF**

31. The mapping exercise shows that no project is currently embracing the topic of national reconciliation as such, while many are touching on the issue from a different and more narrow perspective, be it geographic, sectorial or by beneficiary. The PBF supported reconciliation project will thus help promote complementarity, synergies, sequencing and linkages between local and national, top-down and bottom-up projects, thereby building more trust and safe spaces for Libyan reconciliation processes to take place in the future.

32. Many projects, including those facilitated by the United Nations and the political dialogue process, mostly focus on settling the power-sharing conflict among top political actors and institutions. The peace process has thus only marginally addressed the “psychology of peace” with limited bottom-up initiatives, also due to the limited access to the country. A multi-track mediation strategy should seek to engage with a wider range of powerful and legitimate actors (including tribal leaders, elders, youth, minorities including Tebu, Tuareg and Amazigh, women, civil society and municipalities), allowing them to influence the design and implementation of the agreement and making their voices more directly incorporated into the peace process. Experiences of local reconciliation initiatives show that these local non-state actors are the leading drivers of change in today’s Libya, and that failing to include them will severely hamper any efforts to build long-term legitimacy and reconciliation at the national level.
33. Positive examples of this virtuous dynamics between local and national processes exist. Indeed, while the result of grassroots, local and social efforts, the many local ceasefires agreements that Libya has experience since 2015 benefited from the changed circumstances at the national level in the early months of 2015, when Misrata changed its position towards the UN-facilitated Political Dialogue that had begun in Geneva in January 2015, and became a strong supporter of a negotiated agreement both at the national and local level. If it is clear that positive and informal energies can be mobilized at the local level, they should also yield something at the national level, just as the national level should help local peacemaking, as it did in 2015.

34. Transforming the political culture of a post-conflict society is one of the most difficult aspects of a transition and takes years, if not generations. It requires the changing of behaviour, of perceptions and social norms, and it needs to involve large segments of society. Outreach, sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns will therefore be at the heart of the national reconciliation process. Existing media reform and capacity building projects will be important resources to build upon in that outreach effort and will enable ownership over the process.

35. Transitional justice is certainly a determining factor to making national reconciliation possible. Reconciliation, as well as democracy and the rule of law, are among the main goals of any transitional justice process. Women, in particular, and victims of rape and sexual violence, should be fully considered in the process. Failure to truly respect victims' rights to truth and justice can only lead to renewed cycles of violence, especially in a country where one of the drivers of violence is impunity. Close cooperation and mutual reinforcement with the UNSMIL/HRD transitional justice project will thus be necessary. However, certain security and political conditions are needed to ensure that victims will give their testimony without fears of retaliation, and that judges or commissioners will pursue cases free of political interferences: timing is therefore not ripe for the operationalization of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as planned for by the LPA. Politicization, restrictions of the rights of defendants, absence of public outreach around domestic trials or the ill treatment of detainees can, to the contrary, militate against reconciliation. A careful sequencing is thus necessary, as part of a national strategy that needs to be elaborated by Libyans themselves. UNSMIL and UNDP will be consulting with Libyan actors (experts, activists, CSOs, local leaders and others) throughout the project phase on the design, implementation methodology and framework of the reconciliation process, and will ensure that Libyans remain the sole guardians of the process.

36. After the experts meeting in Tunis in August-September, participants and partners stressed that it is paramount not to lose momentum. Recent political and military events make reconciliation more complicated. These developments have the potential to further divide the country, but they also make reconciliation all the more necessary. In fact, the GNA has made national reconciliation one of its top priorities. While typical national reconciliation projects, including through transitional justice mechanisms, are not feasible in the short term in Libya, research and consultations should be carried out now to start to empower different communities, particularly marginalized groups, to meaningfully engage in reconciliation and nation building. Capacity building will therefore be key to ensure local ownership over any future national reconciliation processes.

37. Because this project aims at promoting sustainable peace by supporting local capacities for conflict resolution and creating a safe space for addressing the root causes of the conflict, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund seems like the relevant mechanism to support it. The project strategy is indeed tailored to the specific needs of Libya, and based on local ownership through comprehensive

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21 The notion should be used carefully. The August workshop confirmed Libyans' doubts about the relevance of transitional justice in the Libyan context, with fears that it may be another foreign import.
23 The former Council of Ministers issued Decree No 119 of 2014 recognizing victims of sexual violence as victims of war, thereby paving the way for granting them reparations and redress. It established a specialized committee tasked with identifying victims of sexual violence during both the Qaddafi regime and the 2011 armed conflict. However, no significant progress has been made in operationalizing the decree since its adoption.
consultations with a wide range of stakeholders (including the experts meeting organized in August 2016 in Tunis). The early availability of PBF funds would help to address the existing critical gap in the peacebuilding process, currently marked by the absence of comprehensive projects that support bottom-up initiatives for women and youth in particular, while fostering a national dynamics for reconciliation, in the hope that a National Reconciliation Commission will later be formed. In line with the PBF’s objective, this project is thus innovative and politically risky. But by engaging a wide variety of actors and through a carefully prioritized, sequenced and narrow set of activities, it has the potential to provide support to unblock the peace process and contribute to the successful implementation of the LPA.

38. Without a real and active political participation of women in the public sphere, there will be no political reconciliation in Libya. Women’s voices need to be heard in order to overcome the current deadlock. Indeed, due to present hardship conditions, several female activists have chosen to either flee the country or refrain from further participation out of fear for their own safety, especially in the east. Internally displaced women, women from minorities, women prisoners and women who, as indirect victims of the conflict, became the sole breadwinner of their families, are particularly vulnerable. This absence of women further jeopardizes the inclusiveness of the political and peace process in Libya, and raises concerns about the future of women’s rights in Libya. By dedicating several of its core activities to women, and always ensuring their participation to the project, including through capacity-building activities, the project will contribute to preparing women to fully, actively and meaningfully take part in the national reconciliation process in Libya.

Catalytic effects of the project

39. The project is designed to have a catalytic effect at three levels:

- **From a funding perspective**, the project aims to launch targeted reconciliation activities with key national stakeholders. It aims to prepare the ground for future processes once government functions are fully restored and key institutions (including the Ministry of National Reconciliation and possibly a future Reconciliation Commission, as well as a Missing Persons and a Truth Commissions planned for in the LPA) are engaged. UNSMIL and UNDP, together with national and local stakeholders, will be filling certain gap immediately, through this project, by providing support to start engaging on national reconciliation, including through a consultative approach, outreach campaign, and bridging the gap between local and national initiatives.

- **From a programmatic perspective**, for many planned activities, the catalytic effect of this project is of great importance, as the dialogue process itself is a form of reconciliation. Consideration should therefore not be focused exclusively on the contents of a reconciliation programme for Libya, but rather on creating an inclusive and participatory framework in which stakeholders will be able to identify together the themes and issues that will need to be addressed for reconciliation to be possible. Moreover, local initiatives should be sustained and linked to the national level. The project will aim at creating momentum for what will be a long-term process of awareness-raising, advocacy, and ultimately reform and reconciliation in Libya.

- **While reconciliation must not be confused with political dialogue, which relates more to strict mediation efforts, the two are mutually reinforcing. The reconciliation project will deepen the UN’s understanding of local dynamics of conflict and actors in reconciliation, which could in turn inform long-term strategies for both UNSMIL’s political support and UN agencies’ programmatic choices. The national reconciliation project will therefore strengthen the United Nations facilitated peace process, and can be seen as an additional “track” that could potentially reinforce other on-going engagements such as the political and security tracks. It is an intrinsic dimension of the restoration of lasting peace in Libya.**
II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

40. Based on the principle that reconciliation in Libya should be entirely nationally owned and led, a workshop with 75 Libyan activists, experts, politicians, traditional leaders and representatives of civil society associations, all experienced in national dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation processes, representing various constituencies and enjoying political credibility and legitimacy, was organized by UNSMIL in Tunis in August/September 2016, with support from the United Nations Development Program, the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, as well as the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goal of this workshop was to map and evaluate existing initiatives and laws in the area of national and local reconciliation, as well as to provide a platform for discussing the main obstacles, challenges, and opportunities for national reconciliation in Libya. Through a series of working groups, panel discussions and presentations, learning from others’ experiences, participants have moved towards defining the general goals, framework, outputs and actors of the desired national reconciliation program.

41. The following outputs are informed by global best practices and respond to the uniqueness of the Libyan context. They are the product of an extensive and broad-based consultative process, including the outcomes and recommendations of this experts meeting on national reconciliation.

a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, target groups

42. In the immediate future, consideration should not be narrowly focused on the contents of a reconciliation strategy for Libya. Rather, attention should be given to creating an inclusive and participatory framework and process for how to identify the issues and challenges that need to be addressed. Additionally, research and consultations should be carried out on how to enable a bottom-up approach to reconciliation and nation building. This project thus aims at creating a broader framework for national reconciliation, by establishing links and synergies between “track 1” mediation (good offices, political dialogue) and “track 2” efforts (bottom-up, local reconciliation). It will support processes of change that connect together local communities, civil society and governments, while enabling a more meaningful participation of critical stakeholders, including women, youth and marginalized groups, in the broader reconciliation process.

Theory of change

43. Linking top-down, institutional peacebuilding processes with bottom-up conflict resolution efforts is likely to contribute to building the necessary horizontal and vertical trust for national reconciliation to start in Libya. The elaboration of a national strategy for reconciliation based on inclusive consultations and outreach, as well as the building of capacities and spaces to engage in reconciliation processes across lines of division, facilitating voices from different groups, are likely to decrease mistrust and strengthen relationships in the short-term, while creating prospects for increased understanding, social cohesion and thus, sustainable peace in the longer term.

Project Outcomes, Outputs and Indicative Activities

Outcome 1.

National reconciliation strategy developed through a consultative and inclusive process, allowing for the meaningful and effective participation of youth, women, and groups from across the Libyan society.

Output 1.1. Draft national reconciliation strategy elaborated
This output will focus on initiating the elaboration of a comprehensive roadmap and vision for national reconciliation in Libya based on inclusive consultations with a wide variety of constituencies. The
roadmap, which will be the result of a multi-stakeholder dialogue and participatory action research, would provide a basis to the development of policies and initiatives of the future National Reconciliation Commission, should it be established, or other mechanisms. The process will be developed step by step, with several groups preparing inputs, presenting them to cross-sectorial and larger groups.

Activities

1. Establish a technical advisory group for the development of a national reconciliation roadmap composed of about 20 national experts from various sides of the conflict and country, including 30% representatives of women, youth and minorities, to meet regularly (4 times) over the project period to conceive, recommend, monitor, and analyse the process.

2. Facilitate the organization of thematic meetings to develop the national reconciliation strategy. The four thematic groups will include 20 activists and experts from a wide range of constituencies (civil society organizations, women’s groups, businesses, local leaders, armed groups, youth or political parties), expected to meet two times per themes, with linkages to the technical advisory group, to provide their specific input on different thematic areas of national reconciliation in a consultative/inclusive manner, including eventual recommendations to feed into the development of a national reconciliation roadmap.

3. Organize geographic meetings in select key localities24, involving local councils, tribes and municipalities, ensuring that women in all structures are involved, in order to address transversal issues specific to reconciliation in each locality, as well as the root causes of the conflict and best ways to build upon the local expertise on reconciliation, feeding into the national strategy. Exact localities will be established based on on-going mapping exercises, estimated as two meetings per each of the three regions in Libya.

4. Facilitate specific women and youth consultations, to ensure that their voices are correctly included in the process, with the support of partner youth and women NGOs (1 for women and 1 for youth), while ensuring the adequate representation of women and youth in the above mentioned geographic and thematic meetings as well.

Note for no cost extension:

Gender mainstreaming was taken into consideration from the very design phase of the project to make sure that women would meaningfully participate at all components of the project. There are, however, additional challenges due to Libyan customary practices of conflict resolution, but also to the security situation. In local dialogues, when dealing with militias, or tribal leaders, it is difficult to reach the 30% women participation threshold. This absence of women further jeopardizes the inclusiveness of the political and peace process in Libya, and raises concerns about the future of women’s rights in Libya. Alternatives, including through independent “women track”, are thus being implemented. The project is dedicating several of its core activities to women, and always ensuring their participation to the project, including through capacity-building activities, the project is contributing to preparing women to fully, actively and meaningfully take part in the national reconciliation process in Libya.

5. Organize a national reconciliation conference/forum to present the inputs and results from the thematic and regional workshops and discuss the draft roadmap for national reconciliation with a wide range of stakeholders from the different regions and segments of Libyan society, including youth and women, with a view to elaborate a national strategy on reconciliation to be owned by Libyans and implemented in the future by relevant national mechanisms.

Output 1.2 Nation-wide outreach and awareness raising campaign launched to build support for reconciliation and strengthen meaningful participation in the process.

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24 These localities will be identified based in a consultative manner, but also based on the results of both the UNSMIL mapping of local reconciliation and Interpeace peace mapping exercise.
Activities
1. Conduct, in partnership with a polling institute, university research centre and partner CSO, quantitative/qualitative analysis studies to understand Libyan’s perception of the meaning of reconciliation, assessing also the levels of social cohesion (including perceptions of the “other” and levels of trust) and thereby provide preliminary information about the existing climate for reconciliation while allowing for tracking over time. Analysis of the findings, at the early stage of the project and at the end, will be published in two reports and be widely disseminated, including recommendations to CSOs, national authorities and the international community. The results of the surveys will feed into the national outreach campaign design, helping to better target its activities and to better measure its impact.

2. National outreach and awareness raising campaign about reconciliation based on the findings of the perception surveys, conducted in cooperation with national media partners (chosen on the basis of a prior mapping of the media landscape), including through two trainings of 25 female and male journalists, the production of short documentaries (including on memories, identity, vision for the future) and sensitization spots (about reconciliation, transitional justice, role of women/youth), leaflets and social media action. Radio or TV shows will be used to talk about common issues that affect all Libyans, allowing coverage of reconciliation consultation processes, thereby highlighting the need for cooperation at all level. Media action will aim at sensitizing the population about the process of reconciliation and creating more ownership and support for it, as well as inviting as many Libyans as possible, in particular youth and women, to have their voices heard.

Note for no cost extension:

Procurement of a company to conduct a nation-wide media campaign on national reconciliation in Libya was delayed. The project was keen to request opening the competition for Libyan companies only to insure national ownership. The current political context is very sensitive and requires a very precise knowledge of the various actors, issues, and the ever-changing dynamics of the conflict. Only national media companies that have been operating in Libya for years, with Libyan experts, can provide such expertise to overcome this risk. Nonetheless, recruiting local qualified media company in Libya took longer than expected due a small pool of skilled companies that can access and implement the campaign across the three regions. The campaign includes abundant activities (organizing marathons, art exhibits, supervising radio shows in remote places, etc.) for $300,000, which would have not be effectively implemented by an international company due to security constraints and lack of local knowledge and contacts.

Output 1.3. Capacity building provided to strengthen the ability of various stakeholders to engage in the reconciliation and dialogue process

Activities
1. Conduct training and other capacity building initiatives for various stakeholders in the national reconciliation process (justice and security actors, youth, women’s associations, tribes, municipalities, political leaders, political parties, religious leaders), on thematic issues related to reconciliation and on methodologies within the reconciliation process (mediation, dialogue, restorative justice, gender), as well as aspects of collaborative leadership to strengthen a culture of collaboration and trust among and between key stakeholders. A total of three trainings with different stakeholders (20 persons at each) are envisaged, plus one training specifically for women activists, to ensure their meaningful participation to the process (4 total).

2. Establish and capacitate a small network of local facilitators and mediators, with a strong focus on women and youth facilitators to enable new people engaging in these processes together with existing facilitators (including PCI, USIP and Interpeace networks). This “pool” can be used as resource for future accompaniment of reconciliation and dialogue.
initiatives, facilitating the sharing of reconciliation experiences across regions and contribute to make these processes better resonate at the national level.

3. Conduct research and analysis on traditional reconciliation mechanisms to increase the understanding of their functioning, principles and actors (Shura councils, tribal councils etc.) and their limitations, especially with regards to their inclusivity, the participation of women and youth, and possible synergies with the formal justice system.

4. Conduct research and analysis on the direct and indirect role and initiatives undertaken by women in reconciliation efforts that often remain invisible. This research will be conducted by one women NGO partner, and will aim at documenting, and thus making visible, the main actions of women in the area of national reconciliation.

Outcome 2.
Bottom-up reconciliation processes strengthened and relevant civil society actors, in particular youth and women, capacitated

Note for No Cost Extension:

Despite difficult and deteriorating security situation in Libya during the first six months of the project, most of the planned activities were implemented. But the inability to hold the activities within Libya remained an important challenge, as it complicates the organization of meetings and considerably impacted the planned budget. In this context, for instance, local dialogues initiatives implemented by the project are not fully delivered as planned. These initiatives are sensitive to the local and national political conditions and dynamics, and most of the time they need to take place in neutral place (mainly outside of Libya), where all parties involved can feel physically safe and not threatened due to their decision to participate in the dialogue processes. As local ownership is key to the success of these processes, and because of the particularity of the Libyan context, the project has been working exclusively with local mediators to facilitate these dialogues. The project is investing in supporting safe spaces for reconciliation and local dialogue processes across and between actors from all backgrounds in various locations (community leaders, rights activists, professionals and technicians with specific skills, businessmen, victim groups, municipalities, and members of militias). These small groups discussions and dialogue processes are intended to generate momentum for reconciliation from the bottom-up, and connect local processes to national reconciliation through establishing a national network of local mediator.

The SRSG has been actively engaged in the dialogue processes attending almost every dialogue event to encourage the parties to reach an agreement, while also receive first-hand information on grievances from the participants. The SRSG is keen on utilizing the dialogue initiatives to enable a bottom-up approach to reconciliation which necessitate providing those communities with means to implement the outcomes of those dialogues. This partnership with the SRSG office is vital so that the project can effectively support the overall peace process and minimize the possibility that initiatives undermine or have a negative effect on the overall political dialogue process.

The project is planning to implement/follow up on all remaining planned dialogue processes during the six-month extension including Bani Walid dialogue, Kufra, Benghazi IDPs Misrata-Tawergha, Meshashya-Zintan, and Sijan-Tiji. These dialogues are necessary to support peace infrastructure for reconciliation in Libya.

Output 2.1 Bottom-up reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives supported

Activities

1. Equip CSOs that are working with religious, elders and traditional leaders, as well as rights activists, women and youth, to engage in a bottom-up approach to the reconciliation process by enabling the implementation of activities that would strengthen the civic engagement of people and increase horizontal trust (grants to two CSOs respectively, in each of the three regions, including at least one women and one youth organization).
Note for No Cost Extension:

The main issues behind the slowdown of implementing the grants can be traced back to availability of cash and fund transfer to Libyan CSOs. Lack of cash in Libyan banks is affecting delivery of micro-capital grant. Awarded CSOs are not able to receive funds in Libya; instead they open bank accounts in Tunisia or elsewhere, where they can withdraw the funds from UNDP and for UNDP since the CSOs must transfer the funds in cash to Libya. Additionally, the Libyan dinar further devalued due to drop in Libyan reserves, low oil export prices and as of November 2017, UNDP cannot verify whether CSOs used the official exchange or the black market to exchange the transferred funds, which raises the risk that this method of transferring money to CSOs ends up encouraging the black market in Libya. To mitigate this issue, some organizations opened bank accounts in neighbouring Tunisia and are provided with a letter by UNDP confirming our agreements. As of April 2018, other CSOs managed to open bank accounts in USD in Libya. All awarded organizations are now able to receive the funds and start implementation.

2. Support safe spaces for reconciliation and teamwork across and between actors from all backgrounds in various locations (three) in Libya (traditional social leaders, rights activists, professionals and technicians with specific skills, businessmen and members of militias), through the facilitation of small-group discussions, roundtables and joint activities.

3. Support CSOs from different areas of the country to design and produce outreach and awareness products around reconciliation and promoting national identity (songs, short video clips, documentaries, social media action), to feed into the national awareness-raising campaign. In particular, women and youth groups will be supported in producing bottom-up sensitization material that speak to their own needs, to promote their specific role and vision of the national reconciliation process.

Output 2.2. Young people are effectively engaged through active participation in the reconciliation processes

Activities

1. Facilitate innovative truth-seeking and dialogue opportunities for youth: in the absence of a formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission, support youth leaders, female and male, to hold their own dialogues and gather their peers’ and families perspectives on the country’s violent past and present, and visioning for a common future, through the use of mediums that resonate with the youth themselves (music, radio reports social media, group dialogue sessions).

2. Support establishment of new communication channels between youth and authorities (national/traditional, including elders) to allow more voice for youth, including through the facilitation of three sub-regional forums to elaborate on their visions for future Libya and present collected stories and testimonies, leading up to the national conference.

3. Support efforts towards inclusion, tolerance and prevention of extremism: support to youth NGOs partners in their awareness raising activities to prevent other young citizens to become radicalized and spoilers to the peace and reconciliation process.

Content and Scope

44. The activities of the project will cover all three regions of Libya. Civil society organizations partnerships as well as the result of the mapping exercises will ensure that key localities are covered. However the project will allow for some flexibility in order to be able to respond to new crisis that could erupt in other places.

45. The target groups include “key people” in the national reconciliation process, i.e. leaders at different levels and in different groups whose buy-in is often necessary to influence the process and reach a
broader audience. This can include political, religious and tribal leaders. However, this project recognizes the importance of engaging and capacitating a broader civil society and new groups, in particular women, youth, and minority groups, in order to overcome divisions inherited from the past throughout the Libyan society.

46. Because youth are at the core of reconciliation in Libya, a specific output of this project is dedicated to ensuring that their needs and concerns are also being transversally considered transversally in the project, and to finding innovative ways to build their support to the process.

47. The project will guarantee the inclusion of 30% women and 30% youth (under 35) in all reconciliation related meetings.

b) Budget

**Table 2: Project Activity Budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome/Output number</th>
<th>Output name</th>
<th>Output budget by RUNO</th>
<th>UN budget category (see table below for list of categories)</th>
<th>Any remarks (e.g. on types of inputs provided or budget justification)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1: National reconciliation strategy developed through a consultative and inclusive process, allowing for the meaningful and effective participation of youth, women, and groups from across the Libyan society.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>Draft national reconciliation strategy elaborated</td>
<td>595,000</td>
<td>Travel Contractual Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>Nation-wide outreach and awareness raising campaign launched to build support for reconciliation and strengthen meaningful participation in the process</td>
<td>477,000</td>
<td>Travel Contractual Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3</td>
<td>Capacity building provided to strengthen the ability of various stakeholders to engage in the reconciliation and dialogue process</td>
<td>300,600</td>
<td>Travel Contractual Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2: Bottom-up reconciliation processes strengthened and relevant civil society actors, in particular youth, capacitated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>Bottom-up reconciliation initiatives supported</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>Grants Travel Contractual Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2</td>
<td>Young people are effectively engaged through active participation in the reconciliation processes</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,942,600</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Project budget by UN categories**

**Note for No Cost Extension:**

Although no additional funds are requested, UNDP is requesting change of budget allocation between categories of more than 15% as explained in the table below.

In February of 2018, the UN lifted the evacuation status in Libya ushering the return of UN agencies to Tripoli. As of June 1, 2018, all UNDP staff will be relocated to Tripoli. The international community and the government of Libya acknowledged the importance of the UN presence on the ground and welcomed the move. That being said, however, the cost of UNDP operations in Libya, compared with the cost of doing business from Tunisia, is increasing due to the nature of operating in a conflict situation with strict security measures.

Major changes in the budget are as follows:

- Transfers and Grants to Counterparts decreased from $590,000 to $488,638.37 due to inability to disperse funds to CSOs for the reasons described above under Output 2.1.
- General Operating and other Direct Costs increased from $156,000 (5.25% of total cost) to $286,679 (9.64% of total cost) to accommodate the increase in operation and security cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Recipient Agency</th>
<th>Purpose of Expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure of UNDP funds in LBP</th>
<th>Components of Expenditure of UNDP funds</th>
<th>Original Budget (LBP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Staff and other personnel</td>
<td>231,000 (UNDP: 1 project manager and 1 assistant)</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>7,508</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>17,708</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contractual services</td>
<td>684,320</td>
<td>293,280 (36,825)</td>
<td></td>
<td>357,426</td>
<td>357,426</td>
<td>977,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Travel  507,500  217,500  0  725,000
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts  413,000  177,000  (101,362)  590,000
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs  109,200  46,800  130,679  156,000
Sub-Total Project Costs  1,945,020  833,580  0  2,778,600
8. Indirect Support Costs*  136,151.4  58,350.6  0  194,502
TOTAL  2,081,171.4  891,930  0  2,973,102

* The rate shall not exceed 7% of the total of categories 1-7, as specified in the PBF MOU and should follow the rules and guidelines of each recipient organization. Note that Agency-incurred direct project implementation costs should be charged to the relevant budget line, according to the Agency's regulations, rules and procedures.

c) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners

48. UNDP has been working in Libya since 1970, and since 2011 was engaged with the Libyan government to support the transition from authoritarian rule through governance and developmental interventions, including strengthening rule of law and facilitating political and administrative reforms. Before the 2011 revolution, the government of Libya was financing the technical and capacity building programmes of UNDP. In post-revolution Libya, the focus of UNDP shifted to democratic transition programmes providing technical support to Libyan institutions in electoral, constitution, local governance, parliament, rule of law and civic engagement projects.

49. After the evacuation of international staff from Libya, UNDP established back office in Tunisia and maintained the main office in Tripoli. Currently, 20 national staff are working in the Tripoli Office including for programme, procurement, finance and operations expertise. The programme staff provides the coordination and quality assurances for the implementation of projects.

50. UNDP has broadened the scope of its interventions from capacity building to recovery and rehabilitation and peace building programmes, partnering with local CSOs and engaging third party companies for hiring and deploying experts as well as implementing projects inside Libya. UNDP has flexible fast track recruitment and procurement procedures that enables to deploy experts, procure goods and deliver services. UNDP has also an established Long Term Agreements (LTAs) with service providers including printing companies, travel agents and hotels. This facilitates the implementation of projects. Finally, the Tripoli main office has the capacity of providing services to UN agencies in Tripoli including UNFPA, UNHABITAT, FAO, IAEA, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC and UNDSS.

Table 4: Overview of RUNO funding in the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous calendar year</th>
<th>RUNO</th>
<th>Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)</th>
<th>Annual Regular Budget in $</th>
<th>Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>All the UNDP Libya projects are funded by donors. Main donors include EU, Germany,</td>
<td>The delivery for the year 2015 was 8.4 Million.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current calendar year</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Main donors include EU, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, UK, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Qatar, and Republic South Korea.</td>
<td>In 2016, the delivery target increased by about 67%. In 2016, the targeted amount for delivery is 12.4 Million.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coordination with other programming and initiatives

51. The project will be implemented in close coordination with other initiatives and on-going programmes led by UNDP and UNMIL, to build synergies in the transition process, in particular the following projects:

- The Stabilization Facility for Libya, which provides support to enhance the legitimacy of the GNA through the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and businesses destroyed by the conflict, to boost municipal capacities and provide short term conflict resolution support.
- Immediate assistance to the Libyan Political Dialogue and Government of National Accord, which is a joint project managed by UNDP providing support to the UNSMIL-led political dialogue process.
- The Support to Transitional Justice at Local and National levels, a joint project between UNDP and UNSMIL, which aims at facilitating dialogue between local groups and supporting national stakeholders in designing a transitional justice process for Libya while creating the necessary conditions for the safe return of displaced communities.
- Amel (Hope) project for the empowerment of women, to strengthen the role of Libyan women in the political transition. This joint UNSMIL and UNDP project provides support to the Women’s Empowerment and Support Unit at the Presidency Council (PC) of the GNA, as well as to key women’s organizations in order to enable them to participate in the transitional process and to provide an effective lobby for women’s rights.

Other implementing partners of the project

52. A possible implementing partner is Interpeace, which is supporting the development of internal capacities within fragile and conflict-affected countries to manage conflicts in non-violent and non-coercive ways. The Interpeace approach adapts different research and dialogue methodologies to the specific context of a country, engaging national actors in inclusive processes that foster collaborative attitudes, yield increased societal trust, and build political legitimacy. The organisation ensures meaningful participation in processes it supports through trust-building and transfer of ownership strategies and mechanisms adapted to each context. Within the Libyan context, Interpeace has been active at the local level since 2012 with a large program for building infrastructures for peace that covered the Southwest of Libya from Sebha to Ghat. Since the end of 2015 and throughout 2016, Interpeace has been engaging in a peace mapping project in Libya with the goal of assessing local capacities for resilience in key Libyan communities and the strategies and lessons that can be learned and used in not-so successful communities across the country. Interpeace will soon establish a local office for its upcoming program in the country to provide administrative and methodological support to its team of facilitators and agents of change in the various communities. Interpeace will support the project implementation through output 1.3, and provide expertise to help establish a local network of facilitators and mediators and develop training module on reconciliation-related topics and methods. Interpeace strong presence in the South will also help in defining and implementing the project’s overall
activities in that region. Finally, its peace mapping work will contribute to identifying key localities where geographic and other meetings could take place. The methodology used in the peace mapping will also be a useful value throughout the project.

53. Other potential partners may include, but are not limited to, the Peaceful Change Initiative (PCI), which is also conducting surveys and research on conflict mapping, building capacities of local leaders for peace, and has collaborated with the UN in various projects. The PCI is working on developing municipal and community capacities and systems to manage local conflicts and promote sustainable peace. PCI is also supporting the establishment of inclusive local peace structures in certain municipalities, including through tribal leaders, CSOs, local media, women and youth groups. In all these activities, PCI works to prevent or reduce violence that is triggered by radical and divisive change, seeking to mitigate the effects of violence on people’s lives while laying the foundations for long-term peace and stability. In Libya, PCI focuses on strengthening the capacity of local leaders to manage conflict during the country’s transition, thereby contributing to laying the foundations for a political settlement at the national level. PCI seeks to achieve these objectives by:

- Strengthening the capacity of local leaders to conduct concrete actions to promote ‘social peace’, both within communities and between communities;
- Supporting Social Peace and Local Development Partnerships that reduce community tensions and build trust in local institutions;
- Creating opportunities for networking among local leaders across the conflict divide, to share experiences and build trust;
- Supporting the international community to ensure that external assistance to Libya is provided in a conflict sensitive way.

For this project specifically, PCI experience on trust capacity building for local leaders and collaborative leadership will be a powerful resource for implementing output 2.1. Furthermore, PCI expertise in conflict analysis will help guarantee the conflict-sensitivity of the project throughout its implementation.

54. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) will be a technical implementing partner for this project (with no financial implication, due to internal regulations of USIP). USIP has provided support to the National Dialogue Preparatory Committee in Libya in 2013, produced a variety of policy-oriented research on Libya (including on tribes25, detention26, and smuggling27), and is currently implementing two conflict mapping initiatives (East and Sirte), while supporting a fellowship study on radicalization trends in the South of Libya. The national reconciliation project will largely benefit from drawing on USIP Libya knowledge, networks (in Libya and among their Regional Forum of Facilitators) and experiences pertaining to reconciliations processes elsewhere, including currently in Iraq, with other UN agencies and local partners.

55. Across Libya, based on a careful prior mapping and evaluation of the media and CSO landscape, the project will establish partnership with various national outlets and associations. These could include the Libyan Dialogue and Reconciliation Organization28, the Benghazi University Center for Research

28 The Libyan Dialogue and Reconciliation Organization is an NGO that provides neutral mediation and facilitates negotiations in various local conflicts in Libya.
and Consultation, the youth group "H2O," the Dialogue and Debate Club, the Human Rights Solidarity Network as well as other organizations, including women organizations such as the group of 10 and the Women Advocacy Force, or women unions in Sabha and Benghazi.

56. These various partnerships will enable and reinforce a comprehensive geographical coverage of the project.

III. Management and coordination

a) Project management

57. The project will follow a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) whereby UNDP takes entire responsibility for the implementation of programme activities but remains guided by the principles of national ownership. Program implementation will follow UNDP's rules and regulations. The overall accountability for programme management will rest with UNDP Resident Representative and UNDP Libya Country Director while day-to-day management of the activities will be with the UNDP Project Manager, reporting to the Country Director (who has the overall accountability) and to the Director of the Political Affairs Division at UNSMIL (for technical substance guidance).

58. The SRSNG has the overall responsibilities of coordinating UN supported reconciliation efforts in Libya. UNSMIL Political Affairs Division will provide political and related advisory support to public outreach, procedural assistance and substantive technical advice. UNSMIL will dedicate time of its staff to work together with the UNDP Project Manager. For activities relating to this project, UNSMIL dedicated staff will have a dual reporting line to UNDP. Project staff will meet regularly with the Head of the UNSMIL Political Affairs Division to discuss progress and overall strategic direction. UNSMIL will also share relevant political information.

59. A Project Board will be established to ensure strategic direction and oversee the implementation of the project. The Project Board will meet every four months to review the project progress, challenges and direction and to revise activities for the following four month period as required. The Project Board is the group responsible for making, by consensus, management decisions for the project, including decisions on changes necessary due to changed context in regards to the on-going conflict situation. The Project Board will be chaired by UNDP Resident Representative (and/or Country Director). Board members will include UNSMIL Political Affairs Division, the Libyan Ministry of Planning as well as other relevant partners.

60. Technical advisors and consultants will be selected in coordination between UNDP and UNSMIL. Technical advisors will be contracted to UNDP and report directly to the project manager. The work of

29 The University of Benghazi Research and Consultation Centre is dealing with various research projects in science and humanities. It conducted a number of surveys during the past five years, including on the constitutional process and national dialogue. It also took part in the world value survey and world governance survey. It is the most reliable research institution in Libya today.

30 H2O is a Libyan youth organization founded in 2011 that communicates the ideas, views and aspirations of Libyan youth, translating them into clear suggestions and demands and presenting them to the national authorities, using a variety of different media. H2O uses creative civic engagement and public education methods to engage youth in the political and social life by enhancing their monitoring role, and raises their demand for more transparent and representative institutions. H2O thereby ensures that Libyan youth opinion reaches a wide audience and is influential at the state and government decision-making level.

31 The Dialogue and Debate Club aims to developing the skills of youth and to provide them an opportunity to express their views and respect the opinions of others. It encourages critical thinking, research skills and tolerance through education and dialogue.

32 Human Rights Solidarity is an NGO that works on human rights monitoring, documentation, outreach and advocacy. It also publishes research on past violations and memorialization, including around the Abu Salim massacre.
the technical advisors will be undertaken, directed and reviewed by UNDP and UNSMIL in coordination.

b) Risks analysis

61. The main identified risks for the project are:

- Libyans’ desire to avoid any influence from external countries and interests, partly in reaction to 42 years of anti-international propaganda, as well as out of fear that external actors could use their perceived post-revolutionary vulnerability for their own political and economic benefit.

- As a consequence, comparisons/best practices or lessons learned are often mistrusted or badly perceived by Libyans: international comparisons should be used carefully and effectively, in particular when interacting with tribal leaders and elders who may feel offended to receive such support when they have been doing reconciliation on their own for decades. Local expertise and experience on reconciliation should be the main building block for the process at a national level.

- Politicization of the reconciliation agenda, and risk of growing confusion between political agreement and social reconciliation. The process will have to walk a fine line between implementing LPA and supporting the GNA, and creating space for a genuinely inclusive process of reconciliation that is seen as credible by a broad spectrum of actors in the society. To be meaningful, the reconciliation project should include, in particular, opponents of the LPA/GNA and allow participants to engage in genuinely open discussions about the future of Libya.

- Risk of reconciliation events being seen as gathering of people handpicked by the UN, whose legitimacy would always be questioned (as is the legitimacy of the UN itself).

- Absence of intrinsic unity at the local level. Tribal rivalries at the sub-regional level exist, as they exist between cities, and they are perhaps even stronger than at the national level. Some tribes or towns will refuse to meet with others, or to travel to some parts of the country. Even within tribes, divisions and issues of representativeness will make these meetings difficult.

- Lack of structured and organized actors, a direct consequence of the Gadhafi regime, which has left Libya deliberately without functioning institutions, political parties and civil society organizations. In the past two years, what little had grown after 2011 was mostly wiped out by violence and fragmentation of the social fabric. This challenge means that reconciliation models based on the participation of formalized political and social groups must undergo serious scrutiny if they are going to be implemented in Libya. Individuals, informal and community-based actors should thus also be involved.

- East-West split, including from a very practical perspective as CSOs and activists from the East are being threatened not to participate to any activities organized by the UN, especially women, who feel unsafe to do so and often require being accompanied. A neutral place such as Ghadames (Nafusa Mountains) should be found to organize reconciliation meetings inside Libya, where all Libyans can attend, as the perception of meetings being organized abroad is negative on the ground and for the UN.

**Table 5 – Risk management matrix**
| Risk 1. Political uncertainty of the country within the current crisis. | Political | High | UNSMIL/UNDP will keep monitoring closely the political developments. The bottom-up focus of this project protects it from too much interferences from institutional political developments. |
| Risk 2. Possible mistrust of civil society partners in government institutions and international organizations, including the UN. | Political | Low/medium | UNSMIL/UNDP will provide international expertise, technical support and training to these actors, while also building upon the expertise of local CSOs. The wide outreach program will also help build trust and legitimacy for the project. |
| Risk 3. Counterparts refuse foreign interferences and defiance against foreign concepts or lessons learned from comparative experiences. | Operational | Low/medium | UNSMIL/UNDP will provide international expertise, technical support and training mostly based on local (Libyan) expertise, as well as regional (Arabic). |
| Risk 4. The on-going crises may impact on the quality of public dialogue and prevent broad participation. | Political and security | High | Devise creative approach for the implementation of the public outreach programme with CSOs/NGOs. Ensure full geographic coverage of the project including through implementing partners. |
| Risk 5. Limited capacity of Libyan counterparts to deliver programmes in a timely manner, and lack of structured and organized actors. | Operational | Medium | UNDP to provide immediate and ongoing technical support to CSOs/NGOs and activists, including capacity building, and will be more flexible by also engaging with informal actors. |
| Risk 6. Security situation does not allow to reach out to all parts of the country. | Security | Medium | UNSMIL/UNDP will put in place contingency planning activities and remote support. Efforts will be made to find a safe place in Libya where all could attend. |

c) Monitoring and evaluation

62. In accordance with the programming policies and procedures outlined in the UNDP User Guide, the project will be monitored through the following:

- On a quarterly basis, a quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in the Quality Management table below.
- An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Project Manager to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.
- A risk log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project implementation.
- Based on the above information recorded in Atlas, a Project Progress Reports (PPR) shall be submitted by the Project Manager to the Project Board through Project Assurance, using the standard report format available in the Executive Snapshot.
- A project Lesson-learned log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the project.
- A Monitoring Schedule Plan shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions/events.

d) Administrative arrangements

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.
Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 June;
- Annual progress reports to be provided no later than 15 November;
- Final (end of project) narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months after the operational closure of the project;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (http://unpbf.org) and the Administrative Agent's website (http://mptf.undp.org).